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WHEN MAY A LITIGANT RELY IN ITS OWN COMPLAINT 
ON ALLEGATIONS FROM ANOTHER COMPLAINT?— 
LIPSKY V. COMMONWEALTH UNITED CORP. AND ITS 
PROGENY – STILL AN UNRESOLVED QUESTION 
Laurence A. Steckman, Esq.* 
Joseph T. Johnson, Esq.** 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the Second Circuit decided Lipsky v. Commonwealth 
United Corp.1 in 1976, district courts within the Second Circuit have 
differed regarding the extent to which a plaintiff, in making its own 
allegations, may refer to or rely on the allegations contained within a 
complaint filed by someone else.  Some courts interpret Lipsky as ar-
ticulating a bright line rule that precludes any reliance on other plead-
ings, on the theory that someone else’s allegations are just that, un-
proven assertions that have not been tested and factually confirmed, 
and thus, cannot support another’s pleading.  Others have interpreted 
Lipsky as not precluding such reliance, at least in some circumstanc-
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has been a member of the Board of Advisors of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
Reporter since 1996. In July 2006, Super Lawyers Magazine, in its premiere New York edition, identi-
fied Mr. Steckman as one of New York’s “Super Lawyers” in securities litigation, an honor he again 
received most recently in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Mr. Steckman received his Masters degree from Colum-
bia University where he was a doctoral candidate in philosophy prior to pursuing a career in law.  He 
received his law degree from Touro Law Center, with honors, where he was a member of the Law Re-
view. He has practiced law for more than twenty-five years and is the author or lead co-author of forty-
five published works on the law, including several law review articles on federal procedure and securi-
ties fraud pleading, causation and damages.  
 
**   Joseph Johnson is a partner in Eaton & Van Winkle LLP.  He was an appellate lawyer early in his 
career, having perfected and argued appeals which resulted in more than forty reported decisions. He 
now has a general commercial litigation practice.  He received his law degree from Albany Law School 
of Union University, where he was a member of the Law Review.  He has practiced law for more than 
twenty years. 
 
1 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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es.  Still others have stated views regarding their interpretation of 
Lipsky, but resolved the cases before them under Rule 11.  Recently, 
several courts, though mentioning Rule 11 and/or Lipsky, seem to be 
applying a standard rooted in the court’s assessment of the apparent 
“plausibility” of the information in the foreign pleading’s text.  The 
cases are very much in conflict. 
Part I discusses Lipsky, its assumptions and cases interpreting 
it as articulating a bright line test, precluding reference to or use of 
pleading content from other cases as the basis for one’s own plead-
ing.  Part II discusses cases rejecting the bright line interpretation, 
and holding that Lipsky does not preclude reference to other plead-
ings, at least in some circumstances.  Part III discusses cases that 
adopt an approach relying on Rule 11 and the concept of “reasonable 
investigation.”  Part III also discusses cases employing what amounts 
to a “plausibility” approach, in which the reviewing court tries to dis-
cern the likelihood that the allegations of a pleading in a different 
case are sufficiently “factual” to justify a pleader’s reliance upon 
them in its own complaint.  The authors conclude that, on balance, 
the majority, bright-line interpretation of Lipsky is the best among 
competing interpretive approaches. 
I. LIPSKY’S ASSUMPTIONS AND THE BRIGHT LINE RULE CASES 
A. Lipsky and the Basis for its Ruling 
The Second Circuit, in Lipsky, addressed whether a plaintiff 
could rely in his complaint on a U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) complaint.2  Bobby Darin’s (a/k/a Walden Cassotto) 
Estate brought a claim for rescission of a stock purchase agreement 
based on material breach, contending that Commonwealth United 
Corporation ( “CUC”) failed to use its best efforts to cause its regis-
tration statement to become effective for shares it sold to Darin.3  The 
Estate’s complaint referenced paragraphs from (and attached) the 
SEC’s civil complaint against CUC objecting to CUC’s registration 
statement for other stock based on allegedly material omissions and 
 
2 Id. at 891. 
3 Id. at 890. 
2
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misleading statements.4  The SEC complaint had resulted in a consent 
judgment.5  The plaintiff did not “dispute that the consent judgment, 
itself, or that the SEC complaint was inadmissible,” but it defended 
the materiality of those allegations to its pleading on the ground that 
the SEC’s position on CUC’s statements was relevant to whether 
CUC used its “best efforts” to register Darin’s stock.6  CUC contend-
ed the consent judgment was inadmissible and, therefore, a fortiori, 
the SEC complaint was immaterial.7  The district court struck those 
allegations from the Estate’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(f), 
without opinion.8 
Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike from a pleading any 
immaterial matter.  However, “[i]n deciding whether to strike a Rule 
12(f) motion on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immate-
rial, it is settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown 
that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible.”9  
The Second Circuit held that although the SEC complaint resulted in 
a consent judgment, that judgment was not the result of an actual ad-
judication of any of the issues and, therefore, could not be evidence 
in the litigation at bar.10  The Court saw no relevant distinction, for 
Rule 12(f) purposes, between the SEC consent judgment, which was 
inadmissible (expressing the view that it could have “no possible 
bearing on the Darin action”), and the SEC complaint, which preced-
ed the consent judgment.11 
For that reason, Lipsky held the SEC complaint could not be 
 
4 Id. at 890-91. 
5 Id. at 892. 
6 Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893. 
7 Id. at 893. 
8 Id. at 892-93. 
9 Id. at 893. 
10 Id. at 893-94.  The Lipsky court made clear that it viewed the issues in the case as evi-
dentiary, stating as part of the preface to its analysis: 
         Evidentiary questions, such as the one present in this case, should 
especially be avoided at such a preliminary stage of the proceedings.  
Usually the questions of relevancy and admissibility in general require 
the context of an ongoing and unfolding trial in which to be properly de-
cided.  And ordinarily neither a district court nor an appellate court 
should decide to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that the 
material could not possibly be relevant on the sterile field of the plead-
ings alone. 
Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94. 
11 Id. at 894 
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properly cited or referenced in the pleading before the district court.12  
The Second Circuit held: 
         This is a consent judgment between a federal 
agency and a private corporation[,] which is not the 
result of an actual adjudication of any of the issues.  
Consequently, it can not [sic] be used as evidence in 
subsequent litigation between that corporation and an-
other party. Fed. Rules Evid., Rule 410, 28 U.S.C.A., 
prohibits a plea of nolo contendere from being later 
used against the party who so pleaded. . . .  The reason 
for this equivalence is that both consent decrees and 
pleas of nolo contendere are not true adjudications of 
the underlying issues; a prior judgment can only be in-
troduced in a later trial for collateral estoppel purposes 
if the issues sought to be precluded were actually ad-
judicated in the prior trial. . . .  The consent decree en-
tered into by the SEC and CUC was the result of pri-
vate bargaining, and there was no hearing or rulings 
or any form of decision on the merits by the district 
court. 
         Since it is clear that the SEC-CUC consent 
judgment, itself, can have no possible bearing on the 
Darin action, the SEC complaint which preceded the 
consent judgment is also immaterial, for the purposes 
of Rule 12(f). 
         We agree that the SEC’s opinion on the suffi-
ciency of the various statements may be relevant and 
may be admissible.  But we do not agree that it neces-
sarily follows that its complaint is appropriately within 
the pleadings.13 
Because Darin’s estate was making allegations unnecessary to 
its pleading of its claim for rescission due to breach, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded its allegations were inadmissible.  Faced with an ap-
peal from an order striking the allegations (without decision), and 
failing to see “how Darin is harmed by the elimination of the SEC 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 893-94 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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references,”14 it affirmed the order.  Although the Lipsky Court ex-
plained that the SEC complaint might be relevant to the question 
whether CUC used best efforts, “neither a complaint nor references to 
a complaint which results in a consent judgment may properly be cit-
ed in the pleadings under the facts of this case.”15 
B. Lipsky and Cases Following a Bright Line Rule 
Since Lipsky, a majority of cases within the Second Circuit 
have held that where a complaint’s allegations are either based on or 
rely upon complaints in other actions that have been dismissed or set-
tled or are otherwise not resolved, they must be immaterial under 
Rule 12(f). 
In In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. 
Litig.,16 for example, allegations in a class action securities complaint 
were stricken because they referred to or relied upon, inter alia, unre-
solved SEC complaints against the same parties.  The court dismissed 
the complaint with leave to replead, cautioning the plaintiffs not to 
include such allegations, stating Second Circuit law was clear “that 
references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative pro-
ceedings that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or legal 
or permissible findings of fact are, as a matter of law, immaterial un-
der Rule 12(f).”17  In support of its holding, the court cited, among 
other cases, Lipsky,18 U.S. v. Gilbert,19 and Brotman v. Nat’l Life Ins. 
 
14 Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94. 
15 Id. at 893. 
16 218 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
17 Id. at 78. 
18 Id. (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 892–94) (observing that Lipsky had likened a consent de-
cree between defendants and the SEC in a separate action to a plea of nolo contendere, and 
citing Fed. R. Evid. 410, which declares nolo pleas inadmissible, to hold that the consent de-
cree and the SEC complaint which preceded it were both immaterial under Rule 12(f) and 
could not be used to prove liability). 
19 Id. at 78-79 (citing Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981) and observing that Gilbert 
had reasoned: 
[T]hat a consent decree was more appropriately likened to the settlement 
of a civil suit than to a nolo contendere plea, so the governing Rule of 
Evidence was 408, not 410, but preserving Lipsky’ s holding that if an 
SEC complaint did not result or has not yet resulted in an adjudication 
on the merits, a plaintiff may not cite the complaint to prove underlying 
facts of liability.) 
Merrill Lynch, 218 F.R.D. 78-79. 
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Co.20  The court continued: 
Similarly, references to an Attorney General’s conclu-
sory report following a preliminary investigation in a 
case that never was presented for nor reached an adju-
dication upon the merits, are also immaterial under 
Rule 12(f).  See Ledford v. Rapid–American Corp., 
No. 86 Civ. 9116, 1988 WL 3428, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 8, 1988) (Keenan, J.) (relying on Lipsky and strik-
ing allegations in a complaint that referred to an inves-
tigation and report by the New York State Division of 
Human Rights which was a non-adjudicative step in 
the administrative proceeding where there had been no 
findings of fact); Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co., Inc., 
No. 95 Civ. 6196(DAB), 1997 WL 47817, at *13–14 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (Batts, J.) (striking the affida-
vit of an SEC investigator filed in a separate action as 
unrelated and serving no purpose in the present case 
other than to inflame the reader). 
         . . . [T]he allegations of the present Amended 
Complaint contained in paragraphs . . . that refer to or 
rely on the SEC’s complaints against Merrill Lynch 
and Henry Blodget, on the NASD’s complaint against 
Phua Young, on the 309 complaints in the ongoing 
IPO Securities Litigation, on the complaint and ap-
pendices in the ongoing IPO Antitrust Litigation, and 
on the Dinallo Affidavit are hereby stricken under 
Rule 12(f) and may not be included in any amended 
pleadings hereafter.21 
In RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman,22 the court held that the ref-
erence to the two complaints setting forth claims  not resolved on the 
merits was improper.23  RSM quoted Merrill Lynch in striking the 
complaints as immaterial, as a matter of law,24 dismissing the plead-
 
20 Id. at 79 (citing Bratmen v. Nat’l Life Ins. Comp., No. 94 CV 3468, 1999 WL 33109 at 
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1999) and observing that Bratmen had reconciled holdings in Lipsky 
and Gilbert). 
21 Id. 
22 643 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
23 Id. at 403-04. 
24 Id. at 404. 
6
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ing with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action: 
TNK–BP’s request that the court strike those exhibits 
that reference two complaints filed in actions that have 
not been resolved on the merits, as well as the para-
graphs in the Third Amended Complaint based on 
those exhibits, is granted because neither complaint 
resulted in an adjudication on the merits or “legally 
permissible findings of fact.” . . .  That request is 
granted because Exhibits B and C are copies of com-
plaints filed in actions that were never resolved on the 
merits and, thus, did not result in any findings of law 
or fact.  Second Circuit case law is clear that para-
graphs in a complaint that are either based on, or rely 
on, complaints in other actions that have been dis-
missed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a 
matter of law, immaterial within the meaning of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(f).25 
As to the two complaints from other actions, which the plain-
tiff had attached as exhibits to its own amended pleading: one was 
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the other was 
discontinued via stipulation.  They were deemed “preliminary steps 
in litigations . . . that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or 
legal permissible findings of fact.”26  The RSM court held both com-
plaints immaterial, as a matter of law, citing Merrill Lynch, and 
struck the other complaints as well as paragraphs in the complaint be-
fore the court relying solely on the stricken complaints.27 
In Platinum and Palladium Commodities Litig.,28 the defend-
 
25 Id. at 403 (discussing Lipsky, the court explained: 
In Lipsky, the court struck a consent decree between defendants and the 
SEC, as well as the underlying complaint filed with the SEC, as immate-
rial. The court reasoned that, because the consent decree was the result 
of a private bargain between the parties and was not a hearing or ruling 
or any form of decision on the merits by the . . . court, . . . it could have 
no possible bearing on the dispute before the court.  For the same rea-
sons, the complaint that preceded the consent judgment was stricken as 
immaterial.  More recently, this reasoning has been applied to strike all 
paragraphs that referred to or relied on complaints in ongoing disputes.) 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
26 RSM Prod. Corp., 643 F. Supp. 2d at 404.  RSM is often cited as a precedent. 
27 Id. at 404. 
28 828 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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ants moved to strike and dismiss the complaint that derived its allega-
tions “wholesale” from an order of the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”), which instituted administrative proceedings, 
made findings of fact, and imposed sanctions and a $25 million fine 
against them.29  The CFTC order was issued after the defendants had 
submitted an offer of settlement, which the CFTC accepted.30  The 
court held the CFTC order, itself, was inadmissible31 and that the 
complaint allegations were a “model” of the kind of pleading Lipsky 
prohibited,32 and explained: 
         Although the CFTC Order included certain fac-
tual findings, it nevertheless was the product of a set-
tlement between the CFTC and the Respondents, not 
an adjudication of the underlying issues in the CFTC 
proceeding.  Plaintiffs are therefore prohibited from 
 
29 Id. at 591. 
30 Id. at 592. 
31 Id. at 593.  Observing that: 
         As courts in this Circuit have found repeatedly, Lipsky teaches that 
references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceed-
ings that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or legal or per-
missible findings of fact are, as a matter of law, immaterial under Rule 
12(f) . . . . See Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (“[c]ourts hold that references in pleadings to agreements with 
state or federal agencies may properly be stricken on a Rule 12(f) mo-
tion.”); Ledford v. Rapid–American Corp., No. 86 Civ. 9116(JFK), 1988 
WL 3428, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1988) (“[r]eferences in a complaint to 
proceedings which do not adjudicate underlying issues may be strick-
en."); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293, 
336 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (The Second Circuit has clearly held that 
consent judgments . . . are not the result of actual adjudications on the 
merits and therefore cannot be used as evidence in subsequent litigation 
between the parties.”) 
Id. (citation omitted). 
32 In re Platinum, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (observing that: 
For example, Paragraph 81 alleges that the CFTC’s charges involved 
what the CFTC found to be a manipulative scheme in NYMEX platinum 
and palladium futures contracts traded in this District during the period 
of at least November 2007 through May 2008 . . . .  Similarly, Paragraph 
83 asserts that [a]s the CFTC’s holding that the Moore Capital Defend-
ants violated Section 9(a)(2) shows, in devising, entering or causing oth-
ers to enter these ‘bang the close’ orders, Defendant Pia was, in fact, an 
employee, agent and other person acting on behalf of each of the Moore 
Defendants . . . .  These allegations are paradigms of the type of pleading 
prohibited by Lipsky and its progeny.) 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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relying on the CFTC Order to plead the “underlying 
facts of liability.”  United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 
94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981); see Footbridge Ltd. v. Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4050(PKC), 2010 
WL 3790810, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010) 
(“[D]efendants’ motion to strike is granted with re-
spect to the allegations . . .  insofar as they are based 
on pleadings, settlements, and government investiga-
tions in other cases.”); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 234 
B.R. at 336 (striking references to an SEC consent or-
der); Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 
1533, 2008 WL 2483288, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 17, 
2008) (striking references to a settlement with the 
New York Attorney General).33 
The court held the plaintiffs were prohibited from relying on 
the CFTC Order to plead the “underlying facts of liability”34 and 
dismissed their claims.35   
In a particularly clear statement of the absolute interpretation 
of Lipsky, Judge Rakoff, in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkt. Inc.,36 set 
forth the traditional justification for the bright line interpretation of 
Lipsky: 
         As a matter of law, an allegation that is neither 
admitted nor denied is simply that, an allegation.  It 
has no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel ef-
fect.  It is precisely for this reason that the Second Cir-
cuit held long ago . . . that a consent judgment be-
tween a federal agency and a private corporation, 
 
33 Id. at 594.  Plaintiffs argued that the CFTC Order was material to their claims because it 
would be admissible at trial, but the court rejected the argument.  The admissibility of “a civ-
il consent decree” such as the CFTC Order, the court held, would be governed by Rule 408, 
citing Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97, and that Rule 408 “bars evidence of a compromise to prove 
liability for the claim, but specifically permits use of such evidence for other purposes.” Id.  
In pleading the facts supporting their claims, Plaintiffs had quoted extensively from the 
CFTC Order – “indicating an express purpose to employ the CFTC Order to prove liability.” 
Id.  The court further noted plaintiffs’ purpose to do so was “manifest in Plaintiffs’ argument 
that the Court should accord deference to the CFTC’s findings of liability” under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
34 Id. at 594 (quoting Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97). 
35 Id. at 595.  The court also struck from the Complaint terms such as “frequent” or “of-
ten” taken directly from the CFTC Order. 
36 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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which is not the result of an actual adjudication of any 
of the issues . . . can not [sic] be used as evidence in 
subsequent litigation . . . .  It follows that the allega-
tions of the complaint that gives rise to the consent 
judgment are not evidence of anything either.  Indeed 
the Lipsky court went so far as to hold that neither [an 
S.E.C.] complaint nor reference to [such] a complaint 
which results in a consent judgment may properly be 
cited in the pleadings in a parallel private action and 
must instead be stricken.37 
In re CRM Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig.38 involved a securities 
fraud complaint.  The district court denied reconsideration of its deci-
sion dismissing the complaint with prejudice and excluding allega-
tions relying on a New York State Workers’ Compensation Board let-
ter and complaint and an Attorney General Notice as “unproven” and, 
thus, having “no evidentiary bearing.”39  CRM relied on Lipsky, RSM, 
and Merrill Lynch.  While the district court noted the existence of 
contrary authority on this issue, it found such authority not binding 
and Lipsky controlling: 
Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to show that reconsideration 
of the decision to exclude these materials is warranted.  
As the Opinion explained, allegations of wrongdoing 
contained in the WCB Letter, the NYAG Notice, and 
the WCB complaint were excluded because the allega-
tions therein were unproven and thus the allegations 
had no evidentiary bearing on Plaintiffs’ case . . . .  In 
so doing, this Court relied on Lipsky . . . which upheld 
a district court’s decision to strike portions of a com-
 
37 Id. at 333 (citation omitted). 
38 No. 10 CIV 00975 (RPP), 2013 WL 787970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013). 
39 Id. at *16, n. 15.  Arguing: 
The specific allegations of wrongdoing contained in the WCB letter and 
paragraph 151 of the CAC are not recited here, as they are unproven al-
legations and thus have no evidentiary bearing in this proceeding. See 
RSM, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 
892–94) (“Second Circuit case law is clear that paragraphs in a com-
plaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other actions that 
have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a matter 
of law, immaterial within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).”). 
Id. 
10
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plaint that were based on allegations from a separate 
legal action that had not been fully adjudicated . . . .  
Plaintiffs claim that this reliance was improper be-
cause, after Lipsky, the Supreme Court and the Second 
Circuit have permitted plaintiffs to rely upon com-
plaints filed in other actions to allege securities fraud . 
. . . 
         Plaintiffs fail, however, to cite any controlling 
authority overturning or vacating the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Lipsky.  Instead, Plaintiffs cite several dis-
trict court cases for the proposition that neither Circuit 
precedent nor logic supports an absolute rule that any 
portion of a pleading that relies on unadjudicated alle-
gations in another complaint is immaterial under Rule 
12(f).40 
The court stated that the district court cases that had rejected 
the absolute interpretation of Lipsky were not binding and that other 
courts had: 
[A]dopted a position in line with the decision ad-
vanced in the Opinion − that paragraphs in a com-
plaint . . . based on, or rely on, complaints from other 
actions dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, 
are, as a matter of law, immaterial within the meaning 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).41 
 
40 Id. at *5-6. (citation omitted). 
41 Id. at *6 (citing RSM and Merrill Lynch); see generally Waterford Twp. Police & Fire 
Ret. Sys. v. Smithtown Bancorp, Inc., No. 10-CV-864 (SLT)(RER), 2014 WL 3569338, at 
*3-4 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (striking facts drawn from confidential witness statements 
referenced in a separate state court complaint that was the result of a consent agreement that 
was the product of a settlement with a federal agency, relying primarily on Lipsky, Merrill 
Lynch, and In re Platinum & Palladium); Precimed v. ECA Med. Instrument, 2014 WL 
1883584, at * 2 (W.D.N.Y. May 12, 2014), (striking allegations made in prior lawsuits, 
which had no bearing on issues in the current matter, noting it was unlikely allegations 
would be admissible at trial and would be prejudicial, and observing cases from which the 
allegations taken were dismissed shortly after being filed without affirmative relief being 
granted, citing Lipsky and RSM -- but denying motion to strike allegations from prior law-
suits referenced in counterclaim regarding financial condition and difficulties in business 
area in issue on ground that they were relevant to allegations regarding breach of agreement 
for financial and business reasons). 
11
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II.  LIPSKY AND THE NOT-SO-BRIGHT LINE RULE CASES 
A separate line of cases rejects Lipsky as articulating a bright 
line rule and concludes that, at least in some circumstances, other 
pleadings may be cited and/or relied upon. 
In SEC v. Lee,42 for example, four complaints were filed by 
the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”), CFTC, SEC and 
Bank of Montreal (“BMO”), respectively, arising from the same 
fraudulent scheme employed by a trader and his supervisor at BMO 
involving brokerages.  The district court denied various defendants’ 
motions to dismiss the complaints and to strike those portions of 
NYMEX’s complaint, which relied for some of its allegations on the 
companion complaints of the SEC and the CFTC.43 
In denying the motion to strike, the court stated that there is 
no absolute bar on (i) “relying on government pleadings or proceed-
ings in order to meet” pleading standards, or (ii) using “information 
contained in an SEC complaint as evidence to support” claims.44  The 
court had already satisfied itself as to the sufficiency of similar 
claims pled in the other complaints and also found NYMEX was not 
solely reliant on the other complaints inasmuch as the basis for some 
of NYMEX’s allegations included direct dealings between it and the 
defendants themselves.45 
Similarly, in In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certifi-
cates Litig.,46 the district court permitted the class action plaintiffs in 
a securities fraud action involving mortgage-backed securities to rely 
on allegations set forth in other complaints, such as one summarizing 
a study of loan documents and the breaches of representations con-
tained therein.47  The district court held that Lipsky does not support 
an absolute rule barring such reliance.48  In observing that “[n]ot all 
complaints are created equal”, the court held that “[i]t makes little 
sense to say that information from [] a study . . . is immaterial simply 
because it is conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.”49 
 
42 720 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
43 Id. at 335. 
44 Id. at 340-41. 
45 Id. at 341. 
46 851 F. Supp. 2d 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
47 Id. at 767-68 n.24. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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Notably, however, the court stated that the balance of the 
complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to support the 
claims regardless of whether it struck the borrowed allegations.50  
Defendants argued complaint sections relying on allegations from 
other litigants’ complaints should be disregarded or stricken, under 
Lipsky,  but the court set forth a different understanding of Lipsky’s 
rationale and ruling than the absolute interpretation cases: 
The Circuit’s rationale was that the consent decree 
was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 410; thus, the 
plaintiff could not derive any evidentiary benefit from 
the complaint that proceeded it. . . .  The Circuit reit-
erated the strong presumption against striking portions 
of the pleadings and cautioned that its holding was 
limited to “the facts of this case.”  . . . Nonetheless, 
some courts in this district have stretched the holding 
in Lipsky to mean that any portion of a pleading that 
relies on unadjudicated allegations in another com-
plaint is immaterial under Rule 12(f) . . . .  Neither 
Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute 
 
50 Id.; see generally Brotman, 1999 WL 33109, at *2 (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94). 
Stating: 
Plaintiff next argues that the consent orders are inadmissible because 
they did not formally adjudicate any of the facts recited therein. See 
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d at 893–94 (holding 
that consent judgment may not be used for collateral estoppel purposes, 
since the underlying issues have not been litigated and decided on the 
merits); Halyalkar v. Bd. of Regents, 527 N.E.2d 1222, 1226–27 (N.Y. 
1988) (admission of guilt pursuant to New Jersey consent order did not 
collaterally estop physician from denying “knowing and willful miscon-
duct” in subsequent New York proceeding).  Here, however, the evi-
dence would be offered not to prove the truth of the underlying factual 
matters recited in the consent orders, but to show that Plaintiff may have 
had an ulterior motive for filing a disability claim and to attack his cred-
ibility with respect to his professed reasons for seeking benefits.  Such 
use of negotiations or agreements to compromise a claim is permissible 
under Rule 408 of the [Fed. R. Evid.] Rule 404(b), while barring the use 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in or-
der to show action in conformity therewith, similarly permits the admis-
sion of such evidence to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and for other 
purposes. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97 (2d Cir. 
1981) (SEC civil consent decree admissible under Rule 404(b) in subse-
quent criminal trial regarding securities law violations to show defendant 
knew of reporting requirements involved in the decree). 
Id. (alternation in citations) (footnotes omitted). 
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rule.  Not all complaints are created equal—while 
some barely satisfy the pleading requirement, others 
are replete with detailed factual information of obvi-
ous relevance to the case at hand.  To take but one ex-
ample, the Ambac complaint . . . recounts a detailed 
study by Ambac Assurance Corp. that revealed wide-
spread breaches of representations in almost 80 per-
cent of the documents supporting the loans it re-
viewed.  It makes little sense to say that information 
from such a study — which the TAC could unques-
tionably rely on if it were mentioned in a news clip-
ping or public testimony — is immaterial simply be-
cause it is conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.  
The other complaints on which the TAC relies are of a 
similar character.  Accordingly, the [c]ourt will not 
strike references to them from the TAC.  In any event, 
nothing rides on how much weight the [c]ourt gives 
the sections of the TAC that rely on other parties’ 
pleadings.  Even if the Court struck every such para-
graph, the TAC would still contain sufficient factual 
allegations to plead claims under Sections 11 and 
12(a) (2).51 
 
Thus, when an independent factual basis for the subject alle-
gations can be discerned from the face of a complaint, or the allega-
tions, generally, have some indicia of reliability, some district courts 
 
51 In re Bears, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 768 n.24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see gen-
erally Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97 (rejecting the argument that the judge improperly admitted into 
evidence an earlier SEC civil consent decree, holding: 
The decree was clearly admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to show 
defendant knew SEC reporting requirements involved in the decree; the 
decree’s prejudicial potential was not great, and [judge] . . . cautioned 
the jury as to the limited inferences they could permissibly draw from it.  
Though we have previously recognized that a consent decree and a nolo 
contendere plea are somewhat analogous in that neither may be used to 
prove underlying facts of liability . . . a nolo plea encounters the bar of 
Fed. R. Evid. 410, while a civil consent decree, as the settlement of a 
civil suit, is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 408.  The latter rule bars evidence 
of a compromise to prove liability for the claim, but specifically permits 
use of such evidence for other purposes. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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have been inclined to permit reliance on borrowed allegations.52  The 
converse is also true.  To make such determinations, however, the re-
viewing court will need to make highly subjective assessments of the 
reliability of pleadings not before the court, based on their intuitions 
about the verisimilitude of untested allegations, made by interested 
pleaders, in advocacy documents. 
In VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp.,53 plaintiff 
VNB Realty, Inc. (“VNB”), a real estate investment trust, purchased 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (“RMBS”) from the defend-
ants.  The plaintiffs claimed the “genesis” of this case was a filing by 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) against the defend-
ants in connection with the purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(collectively, the “GSEs”) of certificates like those purchased by 
VNB (the “FHFA action”).54  The FHFA action was one of seventeen 
actions filed by FHFA and being coordinated before Judge Cote, the 
presiding judge in VNB, of which thirteen were then unresolved.55  
 
52 In Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
for example, class plaintiffs relied upon an analyst report of well-known short seller, Muddy 
Waters Report, and defendants moved to strike arguing it was unreliable and unsubstantiat-
ed, and thus, had no bearing on the issue in dispute citing, inter alia, Lipsky, as support for 
striking “allegations of unadjudicated facts taken from a complaint in a separate proceed-
ing.”  The court held that although “defendants questioned the reliability of the anonymously 
written Muddy Waters Report, an analyst’s report ‘does not implicate the same skepticism as 
a ‘traditional’ anonymous source.’” Id. at 564. (citing In re China Educ. Alliance, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., CV 10–9239 CAS JCX, 2011 WL 4978483 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011)).  The Ho 
court explained “that a ruling that [would] find[] financial analysts’ reports as suspect would 
mean . . . a plaintiff would never be able to rely on an unsigned analyst’s report to support a 
securities fraud allegation.”  Although Defendants argued that Muddy Waters, as a short 
seller of the stock being attacked, was biased, and that Muddy Waters “openly admitted the 
possible inaccuracy of the Report,” the court, further stated that “the reliability of the report 
is a question of fact.” Id.  The Muddy Waters Report cannot, the court held, “be said to clear-
ly ha[ve] no bearing on the issue in dispute.” Id. (citing Global View Ltd. Venture Capital v. 
Great Cent. Basin Exploration, 288 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481) (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).  The court de-
nied Defendants’ motion to strike the report, Lipsky notwithstanding. 
53 No. 11 Civ. 6805 (DLC), 2013 WL 5179197 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013). 
54 Id. at *1. 
55 The VNB court summarized the facts as follows: 
         VNB contends that it purchased RMBS issued from a single secu-
ritization: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2006–1 
(“BOAA 2006–1”).  RMBS are securities entitling the holder to income 
payments from pools of residential mortgage loans (“Supporting Loan 
Groups” or “SLGs”) that are held by a trust.  For the securities at issue 
here, the offering process began with a “sponsor,” defendant Bank of 
America, National Association (“BOA National”), which originated the 
mortgage loans that were to be included in the offering.  The sponsor 
then transferred a portfolio of loans to a trust that was created specifical-
15
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Plaintiffs claimed certain Offering Documents contained materially 
false and misleading statements about the loans’ characteristics and 
defendants moved to strike portions of the pleading on the ground 
they improperly imported passages from complaints in other cases, 
relying on Lipsky, and to dismiss.56 
The court began by noting that Rule 12(f) allows a court to 
strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter,” and that the Second Circuit, in Lipsky, had stated 
that “courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is a 
strong reason for so doing,”57 and has emphasized that Rule 12(f) is 
“designed for excision of material from a pleading, not for dismissal 
of claims in their entirety.”58  Judge Cote noted that striking a portion 
of a pleading is a disfavored, drastic remedy intended as a means to 
avoid “expenditure of time and money litigating spurious issues by 
dispensing with them prior to trial.”59  She noted: “general judicial 
agreement, . . . that motions to strike . . . should be denied unless the 
challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection 
to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of 
 
ly for that securitization; this task was accomplished through the in-
volvement of an intermediary known as a “depositor,” defendant Banc of 
America Mortgage Securities, Inc. (“BOA Mortgage”).  The trust then 
issued certificates to the underwriter, defendant Banc of America Securi-
ties, LLC (“BOA Securities”), which in turn sold them to plaintiff VNB.  
All three of these entities were wholly owned subsidiaries of defendant 
Bank of America Corporation (“BOA Corp.”). 
         The certificates were backed by the underlying mortgages.  Thus, 
their value depended on the ability of mortgagors to repay the loan prin-
cipal and interest and the adequacy of the collateral in the event of de-
fault.  VNB purchased Class 4CB1 certificates.  The certificates pur-
chased by VNB were backed by a different Supporting Loan Group and 
came from a lower tranche than the certificates purchased by the GSEs 
but were nevertheless also rated AAA at the time of issuance and pur-
chase.  The certificates were offered pursuant to a shelf registration 
statement, a prospectus, and a prospectus supplement filed with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  These documents together 
constitute the “Offering Documents” (or “Offering Materials”). 
Id. at *1. 
56 Id. at *2. 
57 Id. at *2 (quoting Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893). 
58 VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *2 (quoting Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 
(2d Cir. 1992)). 
59 Id. (quoting Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.”60 
Defendants relied on Lipsky and certain of its progeny in sup-
port of “the proposition that references to preliminary steps in litiga-
tions and administrative proceedings that did not result in an adjudi-
cation on the merits or legal or permissible findings of fact are, as a 
matter of law, immaterial under Rule 12(f),”61 which proposition the 
court noted traced to Lipsky, which had been read with “varying de-
grees of breadth.”62  Although Judge Cote would decide the case on 
other grounds, she sided with the courts that did not interpret Lipsky 
as articulating a bright line rule precluding citation to complaints 
from other actions: 
         A close reading of Lipsky reveals that it does not 
mandate the elimination of material from a complaint 
simply because the material is copied from another 
complaint.  Lipsky principally addressed whether a 
complaint had adequately pleaded that the offering 
documents filed by the defendants in connection with 
the plaintiff’s shares contained material omissions and 
misrepresentations. . . .  Instead of discussing its own 
offering documents, the plaintiff had copied passages 
from an SEC complaint with allegations about other 
offering documents. . . .  While the plaintiff claimed 
that the sets of documents were “basically duplicates,” 
its pleading had not actually alleged that its own offer-
ing documents were defective.  The Court of Appeals 
remanded the action to the district court to permit the 
plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege inadequacies 
in its own offering documents.63 
She continued: 
         Given this context, Lipsky’s discussion of Rule 
 
60 Id. at *3 (citing 5C. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1382 (3d ed. 2011); U.S. 
v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1, 12 (1st 
Cir. 2005); Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
61 Id. (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, 218 F.R.D. at 78). 
62 Id. (comparing RSM, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 403) (observing that “[p]aragraphs in a com-
plaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other actions that have been dis-
missed, settled, or otherwise not resolved are . . .  immaterial . . . .”) with In re Bear Stearns, 
851 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (“[n]either Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute 
rule.” (discussing RSM)). 
63 VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *3. 
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12(f), and in particular its examination of whether ref-
erences to other pleadings should be stricken as “im-
material,” has limited utility if a plaintiff has ade-
quately identified the material omissions and 
misstatements in the offering documents relevant to 
his claim.  As the Lipsky court stressed, its holding 
was confined to the “facts of this case.” . . .  It stated, 
“we hold that neither a complaint nor references to a 
complaint which results in a consent judgment may 
properly be cited in the pleadings under the facts of 
this case.” . . .  The more general teaching of Lipsky 
that courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless 
there is a strong reason for so doing, . . . has broader 
applicability, as does its admonition that Rule 12(f) 
should be construed strictly against striking portions 
of the pleadings on the grounds of immateriality, and 
if the motion is granted at all, the complaint should be 
pruned with care.64 
Defendants argued numerous complaint paragraphs were cop-
ied verbatim, or with minimal alterations from the other complaints, 
without even an explicit reference to them. 
Nevertheless, Judge Cote, noting that while the plaintiffs’ 
counsel chose to copy the wording used by other lawyers, there is no 
evidentiary rule against “plagiarism.65  Plaintiffs referenced a foren-
sic loan file review performed by the FHFA in another case and, in 
language largely copied from the FHFA’s complaint, the pleading re-
ported the forensic loan file review had involved taking a sample of 
1,000 randomly selected loans from each Supporting Loan Group and 
reviewing them to determine whether, for instance, loan to value rati-
os reported in the Prospectus Supplements were accurate.66  The 
court held the description of the FHFA review did not need be strick-
en. 
The complaint cited a different complaint as the source of cer-
tain factual allegations that apparently originated with “confidential 
witnesses.”  The allegations contained in the sub-paragraphs were, in 
 
64 Id. at *4. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 4. 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/10
2016 AN UNRESOLVED QUESTION 369 
  
turn, copied almost verbatim from five paragraphs of the different 
complaint, containing allegations attributed to confidential sources.  
The court described this part of the pleading as “problematic,” insofar 
as it relied on confidential sources quoted in another complaint, i.e., 
individuals with whom VNB’s counsel did not have “direct con-
tact.”67  However, Judge Cote held “[a]ny deficiency in this regard . . 
. must be tested under the standards arising under Rule 9(b), and may 
not be stricken in advance of that analysis through application of 
Rule 12(f).”68 
In In re OSG Sec. Litig.,69 the district court granted the class 
action plaintiffs’ motion to amend their securities complaint to add 
allegations derived from a motion to dismiss made in another law-
suit.70  The defendants argued Lipsky precluded such addition, but the 
court concluded that Lipsky did not hold that a complaint might never 
reference allegations from a separate proceeding regardless of cir-
cumstances.71  Distinguishing cases interpreting Lipsky as articulating 
a broad, bright line rule precluding all reference to allegations to 
complaints in other proceedings, the court held that Lipsky had not 
gone that far: 
[S]ome district courts in this Circuit have adopted the 
broad rule that a complaint may never reference alle-
gations from a separate proceeding that has not been 
decided on the merits. . . (citation omitted).  However, 
no Second Circuit precedent indicates such a broad 
rule. In 1976, in Lipsky v. Commonwealth United 
Corporation, the Second Circuit held that “neither a 
complaint nor references to a complaint which results 
in a consent judgment may properly be cited in the 
pleadings under the facts of this case” (citation omit-
ted).  However, Lipsky relied on the fact that Federal 
Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 410 “prohibits a plea of no-
lo contendere from being later used against the party 
who so pleaded,” and noted that “nolo pleas have been 
equated with consent decrees” for purposes of the pro-
 
67 Id. 
68 VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *4. 
69 12 F. Supp. 3d 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
70 Id. at 620. 
71 Id. 
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vision at issue . . . (citation omitted).  Because the 
consent decree could not be used as evidence in a sub-
sequent lawsuit, the court reasoned that the complaint 
from that action was also immaterial under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) (citation omitted).72 
Lipsky, the court explained, emphasized the general rule that 
motions to strike pleadings as immaterial should be denied unless it 
can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be 
admissible.  However, the court further stated that it did not hold that 
complaints may never reference allegations from a separate proceed-
ing, under any circumstances.Rather, Lipsky’s holding was limited to 
complaints that ultimately resulted in a consent decree or nolo con-
tendere plea, protected by FRE 410.73 
The court continued: 
The Second Circuit later [post-Lipsky] clarified in 
United States v. Gilbert that civil settlements and con-
sent decrees are governed by FRE 410, not FRE 408 . . 
. (note omitted).  While settlements are inadmissible as 
evidence of liability, they are admissible for other 
purposes, including proof of knowledge . . . (note 
omitted).  It follows that reference to the complaints or 
allegations in such actions would be permissible for 
the same reasons. Thus, it would make little sense to 
strike references to pleadings in ongoing actions, 
which do not trigger the protections or policy concerns 
of FRE 410 or FRE 408 . . . (note omitted).74 
 
72 Id. at 620-21 (citing as examples, Id. at n.3, In re CRM Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 
10 Civ. 975, 2012 WL 1646888 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2012) (plaintiffs’ citation to unproven 
allegations made in other complaints do not constitute factual allegations and must be strick-
en); Low v. Robb, No. 11 Civ. 2321, 2012 WL 173472 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2012) (It is well 
settled that allegations in a complaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other 
actions that have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a matter of law, 
immaterial within the meaning of Rule 12(f)); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 
382, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (striking references to complaints filed in other actions that had 
not been resolved on the merits), aff’d on other grds, 387 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2010); In re 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Secs. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y.2003) ( 
“references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceedings that did not 
result in an adjudication on the merits or legal or permissible findings of fact are, as a matter 
of law, immaterial . . . .”). 
73 In re OSG Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 3d at 621. 
74 Id. 
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At note 8 of the decision, the court explained that Lipsky had 
itself noted—in dicta—that a consent decree could not be used as ev-
idence in subsequent litigation because it was not the result of an ac-
tual adjudication of any of the issues, and that many district courts in-
terpreted this dicta to preclude any reference to an action or 
complaint not decided on the merits.  Noting that several district 
courts recognized Lipsky’s “limited holding” and the “illogic of a 
bright line rule” against citing allegations from other proceedings,75 
the court held: 
While allegations from another lawsuit are not evi-
dence and cannot be “introduced in a later trial for col-
lateral estoppel purposes” (citation omitted) plaintiffs 
need not provide admissible proof at this stage. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery on 
relevant matters that appear “reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (citation 
omitted).  Similarly, plaintiffs may plead facts con-
tained in the Proskauer motion upon information and 
belief, and find admissible evidence to support those 
allegations at a later stage. “ (citation omitted). Even 
allegations of fraud can be made upon information and 
belief where the matters alleged are “peculiarly within 
the opposing party’s knowledge” (citation omitted) as 
 
75 Id. at n.8.  The court cited as examples VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11 
Civ. 6805, 2013 WL 5179197 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (declining to strike portions of a 
complaint citing a complaint in another ongoing action, and noting that whether the allega-
tions met plaintiffs’ pleading burden was a separate question); In re Bear Stearns Mortg. 
Pass–Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 768 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“some 
courts in this district have stretched the holding in Lipsky to mean that any portion of a 
pleading that relies on unadjudicated allegations in another complaint is immaterial under 
Rule 12(f) . . . .   Neither Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute rule.”); John-
son v. M & M Commc’ns, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 187, 189 (D. Conn. 2007) (allowing allegations 
from another lawsuit to remain in the complaint and noting that “whether evidence of the 
prior investigations will be admissible at trial is an issue to be resolved at a later stage of the 
litigation”). See generally Baron v. Miller, 2014 WL 3956562, at 12-13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13 
2014) (Scullin, J.) (adopting magistrate report, Peebles, J., which recommended that that alt-
hough paragraphs from a complaint might ultimately be found to be immaterial to the cause 
of action asserted in the instant pleading, they were not “so impertinent” as to justify striking 
them, given the liberal pleading standard applicable to the motion under consideration, rec-
ommending denial of motion to strike). See also HSN Nordbank AG v. RBS Holdings USA 
Inc., 2015 WL 1307189 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. March 23, 2015) (Gardephe, J.) (some courts, e.g., 
RSM, have “stretched” the holding of Lipsky, and following, instead, the Bear Stearns ap-
proach, allowing reliance on study “conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.”). 
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long as plaintiffs “provide a statement of facts upon 
which the belief is founded.” (Citation omitted).76 
III. THE RULE 11 APPROACH 
Recently, rather than relying on an interpretation of Lipsky to 
resolve whether reliance on another litigant’s pleadings is permitted, 
some judges have looked to Rule 11 for the analysis. 
A. Rule 11 – What is a Proper Investigation? 
In both 1983 and 1993, FRCP 11 was amended with respect 
to the necessary level of pre-filing inquiry into alleged facts.  FRCP 
11(b)(3) currently requires the filer to certify “that to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances. . . the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investi-
gation or discovery.”77  The Advisory Committee Notes to the ‘93 
amendments reiterate that the filer must conduct a reasonable inquiry 
into the facts and does not have license to make claims without any 
factual basis.  As the Supreme Court has made clear: 
[T]he purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home 
to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable re-
sponsibility.  It is at least arguable that these purposes 
are better served by a provision which makes clear 
that, just as the court expects the signer personally-and 
not some nameless person within his law firm-to vali-
date the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers 
filed, so also it will visit upon him personally-and not 
his law firm-its retribution for failing in that responsi-
bility.  The message thereby conveyed to the attorney, 
that this is not a “team effort” but in the last analysis 
 
76 2014 WL 504078, at *2.  Some courts noting conflicting decisions have refused to 
“wade into the debate.” See, e.g., Moses v. Apple Hospitality Reit Inc., 2015 WL 1014327, 
at 2 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2015) (referencing Lipsky, and competing interpretations in Merrill 
Lynch, VBN and Bear Stearns and stating issues would be resolved on other grounds). See 
also UPS Store, Inc. v. Hagan, 2015 WL 1456654, at 11 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 2015) (dis-
cussing Lipsky and VBN). 
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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yours alone, is precisely the point of Rule 11.  Moreo-
ver, psychological effect aside, there will be greater 
economic deterrence upon the signing attorney, who 
will know for certain that the district court will impose 
its sanction entirely upon him, and not divert part of it 
to a partnership of which he may not (if he is only an 
associate) be a member, or which (if he is a member) 
may not choose to seek recompense from him.78 
In In re Lehman Bros. Sec. and Erisa Litig.,79 “[d]efendants 
argued [plaintiff] could not rely on confidential witnesses cited in an-
other complaint to meet its pleading burden.  [Noting that] the Sec-
ond Circuit had not ruled on the exact issue, [the court observed] 
many district courts had held allegations relying on allegations drawn 
from other complaints is improper,”80 but that at least one court had 
held it was “appropriate for a plaintiff, at the pleading stage, to rely 
on confidential witness statements, as recounted in other com-
plaints.”81  The court held “it would be inappropriate to give any 
weight to the alleged confidential witness statements” because there 
was “no suggestion counsel had spoken with these confidential wit-
nesses or even knows who they are.”82  When citing alleged confi-
dential witnesses in a complaint, the court held, a Rule 11 “certifica-
tion means that counsel has spoken with these confidential witnesses 
and knows who they are.”83 
Allowing counsel to rely on confidential witness statements 
recounted in a different complaint would, the court held, provide little 
assurance that factual contentions have evidentiary support.84  The 
court observed that while plaintiffs may rely in their complaints on 
witness statements recounted in newspaper articles and government 
reports, their probative value is “much greater than that of confiden-
 
78 Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126-27, 110 S.Ct. 456, 459-60 
(1989). 
79 2013 WL 3989066 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Kaplan, J.). 
80 Id. at *4 (citing RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 403 (S.D.N.Y.2009) 
(citing Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 892–94 (2d Cir.1976)). 
81 Id. at *4 (citing 380544 Canada, Inc. v. Aspen Tech., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 199, 224–25 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although the confidential informants are not personally known to Plain-
tiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel, the fact that the informants’ accounts are derived from an earlier 
pleading in a different case simply does not render the instant pleading inadequate.”) 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 2013 WL 3989066, at *4. 
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tial witness statements, recounted in . . .[complaints].”85  The court 
observed that “[t]here is significant motive and opportunity for coun-
sel in any case to misuse or mischaracterize confidential witness 
statements in a[n advocacy] pleading.”86  Also, courts have the ability 
to remedy abuses through sanctions, but sanctions are often ineffec-
tive because misconduct will normally come to light, if ever, only 
during or after discovery, when damage is already done.87  As such, 
“[t]he unfairness of permitting a plaintiff in a separate action to rely 
blindly at the pleading stage primarily on confidential witness state-
ments from another case to meet its pleading burden is patent.”88 
In Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Sand Canyon Corp.,89 the 
court noted that “[t]he Second Circuit ha[d] not yet ruled on whether 
plaintiffs can rely on confidential witnesses cited in another com-
plaint to meet their pleading burden[,]”90 and that while several 
courts had permitted “utiliz[ation] of allegations drawn from other 
complaints[,]”91 others had rejected such use.92  The court noted it is 
not a plaintiff’s burden “to show it is permissible for it to quote ac-
counts of confidential sources from a separate proceeding [, but] ra-
ther . . . [d]efendant’s burden to show . . . [p]laintiff may not do so.93  
Defendant argued that Rule 11 “prohibits the use of confidential wit-
ness statements from a different complaint because . . . it requires 
counsel to certify that he has [personally] spoken with the confiden-
tial witnesses and knows who they are.”94  The court rejected that in-
terpretation, holding: 
Rule 11 only requires counsel to certify “that to the 
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and be-
lief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
 
85 Id.; see generally Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc.,887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563-
64(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (distinguishing citation of news reports and confidential sources). 
86 2013 WL 3989066, at *4. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 298 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
90 Id. at 125. (citing Lehman Bros., 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (“the Second Circuit does 
not appear to have ruled on this exact issue”)). 
91 Id. at 126 (citing In re Bear Stearns Mortgage Pass–Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. 
Supp. 2d 746, 768 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 380544 Canada, Inc. v. Aspen Tech., Inc., 544 F. 
Supp. 2d 199, 224–25 (S.D.N.Y.2008)). 
92 Id. at 126 (citing VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 6805, 2013 WL 
5179197, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013); Lehman Bros., 2013 WL 3989066, at *4). 
93 Id. at 126 (quoting 380544 Canada, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d at 224). 
94 Homeward Residential, 298 F.R.D. at 126. 
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cumstances . . . the factual contentions have eviden-
tiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery.”95 
The court held Rule 11 “allow[s] incorporation of allegations 
from other complaints if . . . combined with material the plaintiff has 
investigated personally . . . lend[s] credence to the borrowed allega-
tions.”96  The complaint before the court stated that the confidential 
witness statements were included “on information and belief in their 
truth and on reasonable belief that further inquiry and discovery from 
[D]efendant and others will provide evidence of [their] truth” and that 
the confidential witness statements were supported by allegations of 
bad appraisals in the loans at issue.97  The court noted that the state-
ments contained their own “indicia of reliability,” because the quotes 
were from different employees rather than from, for example, one 
possibly disgruntled or vindictive employee, and also that witnesses 
worked in different geographic areas and in different positions 
throughout the company.98  Because the witnesses reported a con-
sistent pattern of behavior, the court had more “faith in their accura-
cy” and, citing Bear Stearns, held the allegations of appraisal fraud in 
the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b).99 
Essentially, the court found that because the alleged confiden-
tial witness statements, although borrowed from a different com-
plaint, were openly pled on information and belief, contained their 
own indicia of reliability, and were buttressed by independent allega-
tions of bad loan appraisals, their incorporation into the complaint 
was permissible.100  Other courts, relying on Rule 11, however, have 
taken a different view.  In Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,101for exam-
ple, the court explained why citation to the factual content of other 
 
95 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)). 
96 Id. (citing In re Connetics Corp. Secs. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (“attorney may rely in part on other sources as part of his or her [factual] investiga-
tion”); In re Cylink Secs. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (N.D.Cal.2001) (complaint may 
combine plaintiff’s own allegations with SEC complaint allegations)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Homeward Residential, 298 F.R.D. at 126 (citing Bear Stearns, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 767-
68.) (proposing complaints replete with detailed factual information are better for borrowing 
than others). 
100 Id. 
101 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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complaints violates Rule 11: 
[The attorneys] abdicated their own responsibilities 
and relied excessively on Malone contrary to Rule 11 . 
. .they did not rely on Malone only as to some small 
portion of the case.  Rather, they relied on his inquiry 
to justify the entire cause of action.  Indeed, they filed 
the complaint Malone had prepared, changing only the 
name of the plaintiffs and the number of shares owned 
. . . .  Rule 11 requires that an attorney signing a plead-
ing must make a reasonable inquiry personally.  The 
advantage of duplicate personal inquiries is manifest: 
while one attorney might find a complaint well found-
ed in fact and warranted by the law, another, even af-
ter examining the materials available to the first attor-
ney, could come to a contrary conclusion.102 
Thus, some rulings focus on the nature of the borrowed alle-
gation and whether sufficient ground exists for concluding that the 
filer has sufficient corroborative knowledge to support the allegation.  
“Filing a complaint in federal court is no trifling undertaking.  An at-
torney’s signature on a complaint is tantamount to a warranty that the 
complaint is well grounded in fact . . . .”103  Rule 11(b) states that by 
presenting a pleading to the Court, an attorney “certifies that to the 
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the factual conten-
tions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for fur-
ther investigation or discovery.”104  Attorneys have a duty, prior to 
filing a complaint, to conduct a “reasonable” factual investigation but 
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only plead facts, not produce 
admissible evidence.105 
In In re Connetics Corp. Sec. Litig.,106 the court explained in 
some detail what types of sources could be relied upon and the rea-
sons why such reliance would be permissible: 
 
102 Id. at 1280. 
103 Christian v. Mattel, 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). 
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
105 See In re McKesson HBOC Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
106 542 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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When drafting a complaint, an attorney may rely in 
part on other sources, such as a newspaper article . . . 
as part of his or her investigation into the facts, but 
plaintiffs cite no authority that stands for the proposi-
tion that an attorney may rely entirely on another 
complaint as the sole basis for his or her allegations . . 
. .  Here, as to the particular paragraphs that defend-
ants ask the Court to strike, there apparently were no 
“investigative efforts” to combine with plaintiffs’ reli-
ance on the SEC complaint.  Although plaintiffs con-
tend that the SEC complaint is one of many bases for 
plaintiffs’ complaint, they do not contend that they 
conducted independent investigation into the facts al-
leged in the SEC complaint or had any additional ba-
ses for the specific allegations pertaining to [defend-
ants] . . . .  Instead, the SEC complaint appears to be 
the only basis for the allegations . . . .107 
Because, under Rule 11(b), an attorney has a “nondelegable 
responsibility” to “personally . . . validate the truth and legal reasona-
bleness of the papers filed,”108 and “to conduct a reasonable factual 
investigation,”109 the court held that it would make little sense that an 
attorney “somehow can rely on the analysis of attorneys in different 
actions and who are presumably from different law firms.”110  The 
 
107 Id. at 1005.  The court distinguished several cases plaintiffs argued supported their ar-
gument that they could properly incorporate the allegations of the SEC complaint into their 
own complaint.  In re Cylink Sec. Litig. was “inapposite because the question there was 
whether a complaint filed by the SEC may come into the mix of materials considered . . . on 
a motion to dismiss,” not whether incorporation of complaint allegations that relied entirely 
on an SEC complaint was permissible, under Rule 11-- “[T]hese allegations, especially when 
combined with the other transactions detailed in the SEC complaint, provide strong circum-
stantial evidence . . . .” (emphasis added). 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 80-83 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  In 
De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomm., Inc., the court considered Rule 11 but noted that the plain-
tiff had stated “that every allegation in the complaint was verified by plaintiff’s counsel 
through independent investigation.” 259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The court 
held that In re McKesson actually supported defendants’ arguments -- “[t]o the extent that a 
newspaper article corroborates plaintiff’s own investigation and provides detailed factual 
allegations, it can— at least in combination with plaintiff’s investigative efforts—be a rea-
sonable source of information and belief allegations.” (emphasis added). 126 F. Supp. 2d 
1248, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
108 Id. (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)). 
109 Id. (quoting Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
110 Id. (quoting Geinko v. Padda, 2002 WL 276236, *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2002)); see also 
VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 2013 WL 5179197, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 
27
Steckman and Johnson: An Unresolved Question
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
378 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
  
plaintiffs, however, had failed to inform the court as to what other 
sources of information besides the SEC complaint and press release 
they relied on in formulating their specific claims against the defend-
ants.  The complaint, as well, failed to indicate any other sources 
were used to formulate the claims in issue.  “The Court agree[d] with 
defendants that, under Rule 11(b), plaintiffs did not personally inves-
tigate their claims against defendants.”111  It struck each paragraph 
for which the SEC complaint was the sole source of factual support 
as well as all paragraphs containing facts taken directly from the SEC 
complaint, without further investigation.112 
B. Implications of the PSLRA on Securities Fraud 
Pleadings 
For securities fraud claims, additional considerations are 
raised by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”)113—enacted in 1995 to deter securities fraud strike suits.  
The PSLRA brought with it a higher pleading standard for securities 
fraud claims as it relates to misrepresentations and omissions and the 
elements of scienter and loss causation (and a stay of all discovery 
 
2013) (“By drawing its factual allegations from the statements of confidential witnesses in 
AIG’s complaint, VNB is attempting to rely on the substance of those allegations without 
being held responsible for certifying that they are supported by some factual basis, or at least 
that the witnesses did in fact make such statements.  Unlike AIG, VNB presumably does not 
even know who these witnesses are. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 6637(LAK), 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013).  Such 
reliance is impermissible, particularly in light of counsel’s “personal, non-delegable respon-
sibility” under Rule 11 to “validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers filed.” 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989); see also 
Stichting, 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (“Allowing counsel to rely on confidential witness 
statements recounted in a separate complaint would provide the Court little assurance that 
the factual contentions have any evidentiary support.”)”.   Judge Cote further observed that 
by “allowing parties to rely on confidential witness statements drawn from another com-
plaint, the potential existed to incentivize collusion and raises the possibility of complaints 
that are stocked with fabricated confidential witness statements placed in other com-
plaints.”). VBN, 2013 WL 5179197,  at n. 6. 
111 In re Connectics, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005-06; see generally VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank 
of America Corp., 2013 WL 5179197, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Rule 11 concerns . . . are 
heightened here, where VNB has stripped from the FAC any mention of the AIG complaint, 
while preserving the attribution of the statements to confidential witnesses.  This creates the 
apparently erroneous impression that counsel for VNB has actually spoken with these wit-
nesses and can affirm that they did in fact make the statements attributed to them.”). 
112 In re Connectics, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1006. 
113 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4 (2012). 
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pending a motion to dismiss).114  It requires one who pleads misrep-
resentations and omissions on the basis of information and belief to 
“state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”115 
In Faulkner v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,116plaintiffs 
sought to lift a PSLRA discovery stay so they could uncover “facts” 
to support their fraud allegations.117  The district court held the suffi-
ciency of the complaint had to be determined prior to lifting the stay 
because the discovery stay contemplates “discovery should be per-
mitted in securities class actions only after the court has sustained the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint.”118  The PSLRA requires the trial 
court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to satisfy the Act’s height-
ened pleading standards.119  As a matter of law, failure to muster facts 
sufficient to meet the Act’s pleading requirements does not constitute 
the requisite “undue prejudice” to the plaintiff justifying a lift of dis-
covery stay under § 78u–4(b)(3)(B).  To hold otherwise would con-
travene the purpose of the Act’s heightened pleading standards.120 
While the PSLRA expressly requires that sources of infor-
mation and belief be alleged, the underpinning of this requirement 
applies equally to a non-PSLRA complaint.121  Such disclosure ena-
 
114 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)-(3)(B) (2012).  The PSLRA has been interpreted to require 
the pleader to “muster facts” sufficient to meet its heightened pleading standards without the 
aid of discovery. See Faulkner v. Verizon Comm., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001).  To hold otherwise would contravene the very purpose of those standards. Id.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b) also imposes a heightened pleading standard for alleging fraud, which is appli-
cable to securities fraud claims. 
115 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012). 
116 156 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
117 Id. at 402. 
118 See id. at 402-03 (quoting  S.Rep. No. 104–98, 1, 14 (1995)). 
119 See 15 U.S.C.A § 78u–4(b)(3)(A) (2010). 
120 Id. at (b)(3)(B); see also Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 
99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “Congress clearly intended that complaints in 
these securities actions should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs 
rather than information produced by defendants after the action has been filed.”); see also In 
re Carnegie Int’l Corp. Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that the 
stay also precludes defendants from acquiring documents from a third party). 
121 See ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2009).  
Holding: 
The express congressional purpose of the PSLRA provision was to in-
crease the frequency of Rule 11 sanctions in the securities context, and 
thus tilt the “balance” toward greater deterrence of frivolous securities 
claims.  “Recognizing what it termed ‘the need to reduce significantly 
the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of 
victims of fraud to pursue legitimate claims,’ and commenting that the 
‘[e]xisting Rule 11 has not deterred abusive securities litigation,’ the 
29
Steckman and Johnson: An Unresolved Question
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
380 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
  
bles the district court to evaluate the sufficiency of the alleged belief, 
by considering the adequacy and reliability of the sources upon which 
the complaint relies.122 
While VNB Realty v. Bank of Am. Corp.123 did not involve the 
PSLRA, the decision does identify some of the pleading concerns 
raised by relying on another’s complaint. 
C. What kind of “information” and what kind of 
“belief” is really at issue? 
Clearly, a filer may make allegations based upon information 
and belief.124  When the filer properly discloses that he has relied on 
another complaint, it becomes incumbent on the district court to 
evaluate the sufficiency and reliability of that complaint as the filer’s 
source. 
In In re Optionable Sec. Litig.,125 the plaintiffs relied on 
newspaper articles, which purported to describe a report compiled by 
Deloitte and Touche, LLP, as forensic auditor.  The court began its 
analysis by explaining that: “‘[N]ewspaper articles should be credited 
only to the extent that other factual allegations would be - if they are 
 
104th Congress included in the [PSLRA] a measure intended to put 
‘teeth’ in Rule 11.” Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs 
Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1999).  By virtue of this stat-
utory notice, consideration of sanctions in the PSLRA context can never 
be sua sponte and can never come as a surprise, because Congress, not 
the court, has prompted and mandated a Rule 11 finding. 
Id. 
122 See generally De la Fuente v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc.,  259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 
260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Holding: 
There is nothing improper about utilizing information from the SEC as 
evidence to support private claims. Indeed, as plaintiff notes “it would 
have been irresponsible for plaintiff to have ignored the SEC’s highly 
relevant allegations and findings.” (Plaintiff’s Opp., p. 4.)  The striking 
similarity between the SEC’s allegations and plaintiff’s allegations does 
not demonstrate that plaintiff lacked evidentiary support. Rather, the 
SEC allegations provided plaintiff with evidentiary support.  The 
PSLRA does not require that a plaintiff re-invent the wheel before filing 
a complaint; and one could argue that a complaint predicated on the re-
sults of an SEC investigation has far more “evidentiary support” than 
one based on rumor and innuendo gleaned from “Heard on the Street.” 
Id. 
123 2003 WL 51791971, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2003). 
124 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
125 577 F. Supp. 2d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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sufficiently particular and detailed to indicate their reliability.  Con-
clusory allegations of wrongdoing are no more sufficient if they come 
from a newspaper article than from plaintiff’s counsel.’”126  The first 
article described the source of the Deloitte report as “a source famil-
iar with the report” and the second failed to identify a basis for its de-
scription.127  The plaintiffs, nevertheless, argued the articles were suf-
ficient sources to base their information pleading, because 
newspapers are credible and the reporters are diligent.128 
The court noted that the articles provided no basis for believ-
ing that the unidentified source was likely to have known the relevant 
facts about the Deloitte report.129  Additionally, the article allegations 
lacked specificity.130  Nevertheless, the court held, for motion pur-
poses, that it would assume the plaintiffs identified an adequate 
source for their claim that Optionable provided some inaccurate pric-
es.131  The court stated that the articles supported that “limited allega-
tion,” but not the proposition that plaintiff’s losses were attributable 
to Optionable’s alleged mispricing or intentional provision of inaccu-
rate prices.132  Plaintiffs had also alleged someone received payments 
from Optionable based on statements of a confidential witness (an al-
leged analyst who followed Optionable during the relevant time peri-
od).133  Although plaintiffs had identified their source, the court held 
this was insufficient - in addition to identifying the source, the source 
must be affirmatively shown to be likely to know the relevant 
facts,134 and, in the case before the court, there was no reason to be-
lieve the “analyst” was likely to have known such facts.135  As the 
court stated,  “[a]llegations based on the investigation of counsel are 
 
126 Id. at 690 (quoting In re Wet Seal, Inc. Sec. Litig., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1172 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007)). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 690. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 691. 
134 See Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (S.D.N.Y.2004)); 
Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
135 Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 690.  (The allegation, moreover, lacked detail that 
might have suggested this analyst had personal knowledge, as it did not describe the time, 
amount, or method of payment, but simply argued their claim was based on plaintiff’s inves-
tigation). 
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deemed to be made on ‘information and belief’”136 and “the phrase 
‘investigation of counsel’ is meaningless . . . .  ‘[N]o amount of in-
vestigation can transform information and belief-hearsay, essentially 
into personal knowledge.’”137 
Sometimes, reliance on another complaint, coupled with other 
reliable sources, has been found to be adequate.  For example, in Fra-
ternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC,138 the district 
court permitted reliance on an SEC complaint, which resulted in a 
consent judgment, when coupled with statements to investors and a 
court-liquidator’s report.  The court explained: 
         Where allegations are made on information and 
belief, two separate inquiries are required to determine 
whether plaintiffs have pleaded with particularity facts 
sufficient to support their beliefs.  First, plaintiffs’ fac-
tual allegations must be based on adequate sources.  
Plaintiffs must identify sufficiently the sources upon 
which their beliefs are based and those sources must 
have been likely to have known the relevant facts.  
Second, the underlying factual allegations must justify 
the inference that plaintiffs urge.  In other words, 
plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to justify the as-
sertion that the NAVs were inflated and that the 
amount of the inflation would have been material to a 
reasonable investor.139 
Generally, the stronger the factual basis for the filer’s belief, 
that is, the more corroborating sources and the more reliable those 
sources are, the more inclined some district courts may be to sustain 
the allegation.  If a pleading clearly demonstrates that a filer abdicat-
ed his responsibility to conduct a reasonable inquiry and investiga-
tion, it cannot be relied upon by a different pleading, whether viewed 
 
136 See id. at 691 (citing Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 136 (D. Conn. 
2007)). 
137 See id. (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 356  
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
138 376 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
139 Id. at 395 (notes omitted) (“Here, the subsidiary factual allegations that plaintiffs rely 
upon are based upon the Liquidator’s Report . . . statements made by Beacon Hill to inves-
tors, and the SEC Complaint.  These are adequate for Rule 9(b) and PSLRA purposes.  The 
question therefore is whether the factual allegations drawn from these sources support the 
conclusion that the NAVs were materially false and misleading.”). 
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from the perspective of Lipksy or Rule 11.  But absent such clear 
demonstration, if there is some indicia of reliability as to the sources 
relied upon, and some plausibility to the claims, the plausibility ap-
proach could result in a court sustaining the second complaint or its 
content. 
CONCLUSION 
The question whether the content of pleadings from other cas-
es may be properly inserted into one’s own pleading has no easy an-
swer.  As demonstrated above, courts are not only reading Lipsky in 
different ways, but looking to other authorities to provide guidance 
for their decisions, including Rule 11 analyses and “plausibility” ap-
proaches.  The different approaches have their own benefits and dis-
advantages, as summarized below. 
The absolute interpretation of Lipsky as a bright line test is 
easy to apply, and its application will likely reduce judicial time and 
litigation costs. It does so by eliminating the need for judges to enter 
into detailed (likely intuitive) determinations as to the “factual credi-
bility” of the content of pleadings not before the court.  On the other 
hand, there may be factual allegations in the pleadings of other cases 
which present indicia of plausibility that suggest their content could 
be reliable and viewed as “some evidence” of the underlying facts. 
The not-so-bright line interpretation cases largely rely on an 
interpretation of the evidentiary rules the Lipsky Court cited, bol-
stered by the Lipsky Court’s statement that pleadings should not be 
tampered with absent a good reason for so doing.  Untested foreign 
pleadings are, at least in principle, made in compliance with Rule 11.  
Therefore, they seem to be more reliable than just naked assertions.  
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how a reviewing court’s views as to the 
reliability of a foreign pleading could not be substantially subjec-
tive—of the “I know it when I see it” type.  Consideration of such al-
legations also portend the possibility of conflicting outcomes, for ex-
ample, where the case from which the allegations derive is still being 
litigated.  With no practical way to monitor the correctness of a for-
eign pleading or assess that pleader’s good faith in interposing those 
allegations, the current pleader is effectively given  a “free pass” on 
his own pleading, which is inconsistent with and impermissible under 
Rule 11. 
The Rule 11 approach avoids Lipsky interpretation fights, a 
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definite advantage, but it raises its own questions.  To conduct a Rule 
11 “reasonable investigation,” an attorney must review documents 
reasonably expected to contain information material to his or her 
case.  Pleadings, however, are advocacy documents and exaggera-
tions or falsehoods frequently find their way into them, Rule 11 not-
withstanding.  Allowing a pleader to take the content of a complaint 
from another case that he happens to review is not equivalent to a 
personal, good faith basis for alleging the facts upon which the plead-
ing supervenes.  Even if one assumes the initial pleader’s certification 
under Rule 11 was in good faith, this is not equivalent to the current 
pleader’s own Rule 11 certification of a personal, good faith belief in 
a fact interposed. 
The “plausibility approach,” too, has advantages and disad-
vantages.  There is substantial case law and commentary on how the 
“plausibility” concept is applied in current motion practice.  Basical-
ly, the question is whether the particular wrongdoing that the plaintiff 
alleges caused the loss in issue is at least as likely an explanation for 
the loss as the reason(s) the defense musters to support its argument 
for dismissal.  If plaintiff’s explanation in favor of liability is at least 
as likely as defendant’s explanation, the complaint survives.  Courts, 
however, in the present context, should not be making such subjec-
tive judgments about sentences authored by lawyers not before the 
court in pleadings not before the court, in cases not before the court. 
On balance, the absolute interpretation approach remains the 
best approach available notwithstanding that courts adopting other 
approaches have arguments in their favor.  The over-all problem is 
that each of the other approaches cannot help but involve the court in 
making what are likely to be highly intuitive assessments of foreign 
pleadings, the truth of which cannot be determined by the motion 
court, on a Rule 12 motion.  Efforts to make such assessments would, 
of necessity, disregard the undeniable reality that bias and exaggera-
tion is often present in many pleadings, Rule 11 certifications not-
withstanding. 
Such subjective/intuitive approaches would, moreover, be 
particularly problematic in securities litigation.  Under the PSLRA, 
securities plaintiffs are required to plead their cases on a pre-
discovery basis.  Discovery is stayed unless and until the complaint 
survives dismissal.  Allowing pleaders to interpose allegations from 
other cases – including potentially SEC complaints—would allow 
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plaintiffs to effectively circumvent the PSLRA, particularly where, 
based on happenstance, the SEC happens to file a complaint with 
perceived helpful allegations/content to plaintiff. 
The absolute interpretation of Lipsky protects litigants from a 
reliance on documents from other cases whose merits have not been 
proved.  It protects trial courts, which should not be engaged in mak-
ing intuitive assessments of the factual content or the likely merit of 
the content of sentences in advocacy documents, drafted by interested 
parties not before the court, which portend inconsistent results among 
courts potentially addressing the same factual complexes.  In light of 
the different approaches courts are currently taking, it is likely a Sec-
ond Circuit decision will be needed to clarify Lipsky and to determine 
if (or under what circumstances) pleaders in one case may properly 
allege the content of complaints crafted by other pleaders in other 
cases. 
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